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 Online Jihadist Magazines and the “Religious Terrorism” Thesis 
 
Stuart Macdonald, Nyasha Maravanyika, David Nezri, Elliot Parry & Kate Thomas 
 
Abstract 
This article presents findings from an empirical study of 39 issues of five online terrorist 
magazines in order to problematise the concept of religious terrorism. The presentation of the 
study’s findings focuses on the magazines’ textual content, examining the types of textual 
item each magazine contains, how the producers of the magazines perceive the publications, 
the justifications the magazines offer for the groups’ activities, and the motivations that 
underlie these activities. This analysis shows that there are important differences between the 
messages each group expounds. These differences, the article argues, are obscured by the 
homogeneous label religious terrorism. Moreover, an examination of these groups’ messages 
shows that the purported distinction between religion and politics is unsustainable and has 
detrimental political-normative repercussions. 
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Introduction 
At the heart of both the new terrorism and fourth wave theses of modern terrorism lies the 
claim that the terrorism of today is religious in nature (Hoffman 1998; Laqueur 1999; 
Rapoport 2004). By drawing on the findings of an empirical study of online jihadist 
magazines, this article seeks to problematise this claim. The article begins by outlining the 
religious terrorism thesis and summarising existing criticisms of it. It then introduces the 
empirical study. After an overview of the dataset the article presents three sets of findings 
pertaining to the textual content of the magazines. The first focuses on the types of textual 
item contained within each magazine, the second examines the magazines’ editorials to 
investigate how the publications are perceived by those that produce them, and the third 
explores the justifications that are advanced in the magazines’ articles and the motivations 
that underlie these. The article thus seeks to contribute to the field of Critical Terrorism 
Studies by taking seriously the voice of the violent actor. It uses this voice to identify 
important differences between the messages expounded by the producers of these magazines 
and argues that these differences are obscured by imposing the homogeneous label religious 
terrorism. These differences also illustrate the difficulties in juxtaposing religion with politics 
since the magazines’ heterogeneity is the product of politics, understood as “the exercise of 
power” (Hay 2002, 187). Having shown that the “religious terrorism” thesis is analytically 
deficient, the article concludes by arguing that it also has important political-normative 
repercussions. Not only does it contribute to a stigmatisation of the Muslim faith; it also 
reinforces the very Othering that characterises the dichotomous identity choice appeals found 
within these magazines’ pages. 
 
The “Religious Terrorism” Thesis 
The catalyst for religious terrorism is said to be the threat of secularisation (Ranstorp 1996). 
Not only is there a “widespread perception that politics is immoral and public life desperately 
needs the sacred cleansing that religion can offer it” (Juergensmeyer 1997, 20), religious 
terrorist groups also perceive a threat to their identity and survival. For this reason, they 
“perceive their actions as defensive and reactive in character and justify them in this way” 
(Ranstorp 1996, 47). The groups’ aims are defined in religious terms, with leaders providing 
a theological justification for the groups’ actions (Bin Hassan 2007). Religious terrorist 
groups frequently make use of “well-established, mainstream religious concepts”, in order to 
appeal to a vast “ready-made, self-conscious constituency” (Sedgwick 2004, 808). This has a 
number of important effects: it creates a sharp distinction between the faithful and the 
unfaithful, leaving no middle ground and Othering those outside the group (Ranstorp 1996); 
it identifies the group’s claims with the commands of God, giving the group “an 
uncontestable superiority over competing claims which now appear to be blasphemic having 
no moral justification at all” (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000, 655-656); and, it results in a 
“zero-sum game” in which one side is regarded as fanatical and the other as evil, creating a 
“vicious circle of antagonism” (656). For this reason, many descriptions of religious terrorism 
“openly state, or strongly imply, that the religious element is a central cause of the violence, 
not simply something that is used to legitimize tactics or motivate followers” (Gunning and 
Jackson 2011, 373). 
Accounts of religious terrorism state that one of its key characteristics is its lethality and 
indiscriminate use of violence. Since religious terrorists refer to their enemies in 
dehumanizing terms (Ranstorp 1996), since they regard violence as a sacramental act or 
divine duty (Hoffman 1995), and since they regard violence not as a means to an end but as 
an end in itself (Hoffman 1995), they are not constrained by the political, moral, or practical 
constraints that seem to affect other terrorists. Hence James Woolsey, the former head of the 
C.I.A., claimed that today “Terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to destroy the 
table and everyone sitting at it” (Lemann 2001). In particular, religious terrorists utilize 
notions of martyrdom and self-sacrifice, “idealising suffering in this world and promising 
rewards in another” (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000, 656). This has led to what Rapoport 
describes as “the most deadly tactical innovation” of his fourth wave of modern terrorism: 
suicide bombing (Rapoport 2004, 62). 
The religious terrorism thesis has, however, been criticised. The first set of criticisms is 
classificatory. Gunning and Jackson (2011) have queried the assumption that religion is 
clearly definable and that it can be straightforwardly distinguished from the secular and the 
political. They point out that the term religion, as it is used in English-language social science 
publications, is historically and culturally specific and that what we think of as religion today 
“is a product of the particular political and social trajectory of European politics, when, as 
part of the rise of the modern state, and in response to both ideational shifts and the ‘religious 
wars’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religion was relegated to the private sphere 
and conceptualized as a set of irrational beliefs in opposition to ‘rational science’” (375; see 
also Francis 2016). As an example of the difficulty of distinguishing between religious and 
political discourse, they state: 
“Creating an Islamic State is a more explicitly religiously inspired goal. But even here 
we would query whether this could be usefully categorized as simply religious. It may 
be framed and inspired by a religious tradition, but it has emerged within a very 
particular – and a particularly political and modern – interpretation of religion which 
has been moulded by a number of arguably ‘secular’ dynamics” (376-377)  
The second set of criticisms is empirical. Here, Gunning and Jackson (2011) contest the claim 
that religious terrorists are more fanatical and indiscriminate in their use of violence. They 
point out that many religious terrorist groups have “this-worldly goals and constituencies” 
and demonstrate a powerful strategic rationality, whilst some secular terrorist groups have 
committed symbolic acts of violence, painted their conflict in terms akin to cosmic war and 
“described their enemies in similar eschatological terms as al-Qaeda” (378). Statistics which 
are used to evidence the claim that religious terrorism is more lethal are, they argue, “skewed 
by a few exceptionally lethal attacks and by vast discrepancies between groups” (379). 
Furthermore, interpreting such data is a complex task given the numerous factors at play. 
Focusing on Middle Eastern violence, they point out that “many of the structural factors 
named in the wider literature as key ‘drivers’ of political violence … are present in 
abundance” (380).  
The third set of criticisms concerns the causal role of religion. In their exposition of a 
constructivist approach to the role faith plays in political conflict, Hasenclever and Rittberger 
(2000) warn that “the constitutive effects of intersubjective understandings” should not be 
conflated with causal effects (648). The leaders of religious terrorist groups may seek to 
utilise religious traditions for the purpose of “demonisation of the enemy, promoting a zero-
sum mentality, motivating (and reaching) the faithful and creating an in-group identity” 
(Gunning and Jackson 2011, 380-381), but this in itself in insufficient to establish causation 
and their rhetorical power in this respect is “far from unlimited” (Hasenclever and Rittberger 
2000, 649). Gunning and Jackson (2011) state that religion is: 
“… particularly likely to play a role in conflict when political and religious elites 
decide it is in their mutual interest to ally themselves or when foreign occupation 
overlaps with religious difference … But to label such conflicts ‘religious’ risks 
obscuring the complex interaction between religion and all these other factors” (380-
381)  
Moreover, at the individual level, people join or leave groups for reasons other than 
ideological commitment, including family or friendship ties, search for social acceptance and 
securing access to otherwise unavailable goods or services. In fact, ideological commitment 
tends to follow action, not the other way around (Gunning and Jackson 2011). 
The final criticism of the religious terrorism thesis is that it homogenises a wide array of 
different groups with different objectives, structures and behaviours (Gunning and Jackson 
2011). Indeed, advocates of the religious terrorism thesis acknowledge this complexity. 
Ranstorp (1996) states that “religious terrorists are, by their very nature, largely motivated by 
religion, but they are also driven by day-to-day practical political considerations within their 
context-specific environment” (44). Conversely, Hoffman (1995) states that secular/political 
groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Tamil Tigers have a strong 
religious element. Similarly, Sedgwick (2004) writes that whilst “al-Qaeda’s objectives were 
almost certainly political rather than religious and owe more to European radicalism than to 
Islam” al-Qaeda is nonetheless “clearly marked by Islam, and not only in its ultimate aims. 
Al-Qaeda’s potential constituency is the world’s Muslims, and the means it uses to mobilize 
support in this constituency are derived from Islam” (805). 
This article seeks to add to this body of literature by drawing on the findings of its study of 
online jihadist magazines to illustrate the heterogeneity that exists between groups that not 
only fall within the notion of religious terrorism but that also all claim to act in the name of 
the same religion. As such, the article seeks to add empirical support to the statement that “a 
broad label such as ‘religious’ is problematic because religion can be interpreted, and has 
been lived, in countless different manners” (Gunning and Jackson 2011, 378).  
 
Methodology 
This article focuses exclusively on online magazines, so excludes other types of online 
publication (such as newsletters and manifestos) and magazines written in other languages. In 
total, there were five magazines that met the criteria for inclusion, all of which were 
published by groups that follow a jihadist ideology: Azan (published by the Taliban in 
Khurasan); Dabiq (published by Islamic State); Gaidi Mtaani (published by al-Shabaab); 
Inspire (published by al-Qaeda); and, Jihad Recollections (also published by al-Qaeda, and 
apparently the forerunner to Inspirei). The study focused on issues published between 1 
January 2009 and 30 June 2015. During this period a total of 39 issues were published; 
together, these contained 892,174 words of content and 3869 images (Macdonald et al 2015). 
Table 1 presents an overview of this dataset by year of publication. 
 
Table 1: Overview of online English language terrorist magazines by year of publication. 
  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
January 
– June 
2015 
Total 
M
ag
az
in
e
 
Azan     4 2  6 
Dabiq      6 3 9 
Gaidi Mtaani    2 2 2 1 7 
Inspire  4 4 1 2 2  13 
Jihad 
Recollections 
4       4 
Total 4 4 4 3 8 12 4 39 
 
Note. In the second half of 2015 a further six issues were published: three issues of Dabiq; 
one issue of Inspire; and two issues of a new magazine called Al-Risalah, published by al-
Nusra.  
  
Findings 
This section is divided into three parts. It begins with an overview of the textual items 
contained within the magazines. It then examines two types of textual item in greater detail: 
editorials; and, articles. 
 
Overview of textual items 
Between them, the 39 issues contained a total of 505 textual items. These were divided into 
seven categories using an iterative data-led process. First, a list of types of textual item was 
drawn up based on an initial reading of the magazines. During the first round of coding this 
list was amended in the light of the content of the magazines. The list was then finalised, and 
each of the items was viewed a second time and re-coded where necessary to ensure 
consistency. The breakdown is shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Types of textual item contained within the magazines. 
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Inspire 117 
(57.4%) 
27 
(13.2%) 
13 
(6.4%) 
18 
(8.8%) 
8 
(3.9%) 
9 
(4.4%) 
12 
(5.9%) 
204 
Dabiq 84 
(82.4%) 
0 
9 
(8.8%) 
0 
3 
(2.9%) 
6 
(5.9%) 
0 102 
Azan 74 
(73.3%) 
0 
6 
(5.9%) 
3 
(3.0%) 
16 
(15.8%) 
2 
(2.0%) 
0 101 
Jihad 
Recollections 
54 
(76.1%) 
7 
(9.9%) 
4 
(5.6%) 
4 
(5.6%) 
2 
(2.8%) 
0 0 71 
Gaidi 
Mtaani 
17 
(63.0%) 
2 
(7.4%) 
4 
(14.8%) 
1 
(3.7%) 
2 
(7.4%) 
0 
1 
(3.7%) 
27 
Total 346 
(68.5%) 
36 
(7.1%) 
36 
(7.1%) 
26 
(5.1%) 
31 
(6.1%) 
17 
(3.4%) 
13 
(2.6%) 
505 
 
(NB: Gaidi Mtaani also contained a total of 22 non-English language textual items, which are 
not included in this table) 
 
Whilst the most common type of textual item across all five magazines was articles, the 
proportion of items in Dabiq that were classified as articles was significantly higher than for 
the other four titles, particularly Inspire (82.4% compared to 57.4%). Two other points are 
also worth highlighting, for they are indicative of the differing structures and objectives of 
the various groups and so support the criticisms of the homogeneity of the label religious 
terrorism. First, table 2 shows the importance Azan places on specific figures of authority. It 
contained a greater proportion of statements than any of the other magazines (i.e., formal 
statements that were presented as being official and were attributed to the group’s leadership 
structure). Of the 16 statements found in the six issues of Azan, three were attributed to 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and two each to Abdullah Azzam, Mulla Muhammad Umar and Usama 
bin Laden.ii By contrast, the thirteen issues of Inspire contained a total of eight statements, 
six of which were attributed to the group itself as opposed to a named individual. Inspire also 
contained a total of nine interviews and 12 eulogies. Whilst the interviews tended to be with 
leadership figures (such as Abu Basir, Adil al-Abbab and Anwar al-Awlaki), the eulogies told 
the stories of individuals that had been killed whilst fighting (all of them men), using such 
titles as “The Veteran Lion” (issue six, 17), “Sincerity of a Hero” (issue six, 27) and “The 
Face of Joy” (issue nine, 14). This recognition of rank-and-file individuals reflects Inspire’s 
stated aim to encourage lone actor attacks, and stands in marked contrast to Azan, which 
contained no eulogies and only two interviews (one describing the claimed escape from 
prison of Adnan Rasheed and the other with the German Mujahid Abu Adam).  
The second noteworthy point, also reflective of Inspire’s stated aim, is the prevalence of 
instructional guides within its pages, particularly in comparison to the magazines of the other 
groups. Neither Dabiq nor Azan contained any instructional guides, whilst only two guides 
were found in Gaidi Mtaani (one on how to make a molotov cocktail, the other on how to 
stop security agencies gathering information from your mobile phone). So, 34 of the 36 
guides were found in the two al-Qaeda magazines, Jihad Recollections and Inspire. 
Moreover, whilst the most common types of guide in Inspire were bomb-making (eight 
items) and using firearms (four items), the most common in Jihad Recollections was keep-fit 
(four items). Inspire thus appeared to be the only one of the magazines that sought to equip 
readers to a significant extent with the skills needed to carry out bomb and firearm attacks. 
The differences between the magazines in terms of the composition of their textual content 
reflected different strategies for influencing readers’ thoughts and actions. Whilst Azan 
emphasised formal statements from identified leadership figures, Inspire acknowledged and 
glorified rank-and-file individuals and provided practical how-to guides that purported to 
make complex tasks such as bomb-making straightforward and offered advice on how to 
avoid arousing suspicion (Conway, Parker and Looney 2017). These attempts to shape 
readers’ conduct through incitement and persuasion may thus be understood as exercises of 
power; in other words, as politics (Hay 2002). 
 
Editorials 
Every issue of all five of the magazines contained an editorial/foreword.iii These offer a 
valuable insight into the objectives of the magazine’s producers, and their perception of the 
publication. Examination of their voice provides a further illustration of the difficulties with 
the homogeneous label religious terrorism. Moreover, like the differences in the textual 
composition outlined above, the differences between the magazines’ editorials/forewords are 
the product of politics, further underlining the classificatory difficulties described by Gunning 
and Jackson. 
Perhaps the most distinctive of the five sets of editorials/forewords was found in Azan. The 
editorial found in issue one stated: 
“So, in times such as ours, when truth has become difficult to see and follow, by the 
Grace of Allah, Azan is a humble effort at renewing the call to Tawheed that has been 
proclaimed by the Prophets and the men of Allah throughout time … It is hoped that 
Allah Would accept this work and make it a source of Guidance for the entire 
humanity and a source of humiliation for every stubborn tyrant” (p. 3) 
Similarly, issue two’s editorial stated: “We hope that Allah makes this issue of benefit to 
everyone as well. All good in it is from Allah and all the mistakes are from our own selves … 
So whoever finds good in it should Praise Allah Alone, The One Worthy of All Praise” (p. 3). 
The implied assertion that Azan contains “good … from Allah” and the invocation of the 
proclamations of past prophets are suggestive of claims to divine truth and authority. This 
again illustrates the difficulty in juxtaposing religion with politics. Claims of divine authority 
are offered by Lukes (2005) as one example of “the supreme and most insidious exercise of 
power”. He explains that claims of divine ordination seek to prevent people from having 
grievances “by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things” (28). 
Whilst the editorials/forewords of the other four magazines were also framed within a 
religious discourse, they sought to engage and influence readers in a quite different manner: 
by emphasising the reporting of current events, issues of wider interest and academic 
discussion and debate. For example, the editorial contained in issue three of Gaidi Mtaani 
stated, “Hopefully this magazine will also do its duty of giving objective reporting and 
analysis of the Jihad in Somalia and expose the lies and propaganda spread by the KDF 
Kuffar” (p. 4), whilst the one in issue seven claimed, “We have also presented you, the reader 
with a new assortment of enlightening articles, insightful poetry and the latest news from the 
lands of Hijra and Shar’iah to accompany you in your journey of Jihad” (p. 4). The forewords 
in Dabiq also emphasised the reporting of news and updates. The foreword to issue one 
stated, “After a review of some of the comments received on the first issues of Islamic State 
News and Islamic State Report, AlHayat Media Center decided to carry on the effort – in sha-
allah – into a periodical magazine focusing on issues of tawhid [oneness of God], manhaj 
[methodology], hijrah [migration], jihad [combat], and jama’ah [organisation]” (p. 3), whilst 
the foreword to the next issue promised to “convey the position of the Islamic State 
leadership” on the issue of “[readers’] obligations towards the Khilafah” (p. 3). Meanwhile, 
Jihad Recollections presented itself more as a forum for academic debate and understanding. 
Issue two promised “a major focus on producing academic-style analysis that are not only 
just opinionated responses to current events, but also constructive criticisms which we hope 
will breed a culture of deep analytical thinking in the jihadi community as well as amongst 
the most senior of jihadi’s” (p. 2), whilst issues one and three claimed respectively that 
“Some of [our guest writers] have completed their Masters degree in their respective field of 
study, and so that academia approach will be reflected throughout the magazine” (p. 2) and 
“Our magazine wishes to set a standard in the understanding of the religion in the modern 
day” (p. 4). Expressions like “journey of Jihad” (Gaidi Mtaani), “obligations towards the 
Khilafah” (Dabiq) and “understanding of the religion in the modern day” (Jihad 
Recollections) show that the producers of these magazines present them as being religious in 
nature. Yet the magazines’ producers are also engaged in politics for, whilst they seek to 
persuade and instruct readers differently to Azan, they nonetheless exercise power by shaping 
the conduct of their readers. 
Like Gaidi Mtaani and Dabiq, the editorials in Inspire also promised coverage of current 
issues. In fact, readers were invited to suggest topics – “We also call upon and encourage our 
readers to contribute by sending their articles, comments or suggestions to us” (issue one, p. 
2) – and, indeed, an article on “the shar’iah view on killing ‘civilians’ in the operations of 
mujahidin” found in issue eight was presented as a response to the most asked question 
during an “exclusive video interview” with Anwar al-Awlaki (p. 3). This emphasis on reader-
generated content stands in marked contrast to Azan’s implied claims that it contained 
divinely ordained truth. The producers of these magazines thus appear to have quite different 
perceptions of their own role, again demonstrating the dangers of homogenisation. Inspire 
was also the most explicit of the magazines in stating its objectives. These were twofold: 
“The first one is to call for and inspire to jihad in the English speaking world and second one 
is to deliver to every inspired Muslim anywhere around the world the operational know-how 
of carrying out attacks from within the West” (issue nine, p. 4). This sentence is a particularly 
stark example of the coincidence of politics – the magazine seeks to influence readers’ 
conduct by providing them with the motivation and ability to perpetrate acts of violence – 
and religion – the acts that the magazine seeks to incite are portrayed as acts of jihad 
committed by devout Muslims. 
 
Articles 
Since articles were the most common type of textual item in all five of the magazines, they 
were examined further in terms of both their underlying motivations and justificatory 
grounds. To identify the motivations underlying, and justifications employed in, the 
magazines’ articles, a similar process was employed to the one used to classify the different 
types of textual item. First, lists of potential justifications and motivations were drawn up 
based on prior background reading. During the first reading of the magazines these lists were 
amended and adapted in the light of the content of the articles. The two lists were then 
finalised, and each of the articles was read a second time and re-coded where necessary to 
ensure consistency. The results are shown in tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: The motivations underlying the articles. 
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Inspire 117 
67 
(57.3%) 
56 
(47.9%) 
70 
(59.8%) 
34 
(29.1%) 
33 
(28.2%) 
29 
(24.8%) 
18 
(15.4%) 
Dabiq 84 
41 
(48.8%) 
53 
(63.1%) 
43 
(51.2%) 
44 
(52.4%) 
16 
(19.0%) 
28 
(33.3%) 
11 
(13.1%) 
Azan 74 
51 
(68.9%) 
33 
(44.6%) 
26 
(35.1%) 
12 
(16.2%) 
28 
(37.8%) 
6 
(8.1%) 
12 
(16.2%) 
Jihad 
Recollections 
54 
20 
(37.0%) 
22 
(40.7%) 
18 
(33.3%) 
2 
(3.7%) 
8 
(14.8%) 
2 
(3.7%) 
4 
(7.4%) 
Gaidi 
Mtaani 
17 
10 
(58.8%) 
7 
(41.2%) 
11 
(64.7%) 
2 
(11.8%) 
3 
(17.6%) 
1 
(5.9%) 
5 
(29.4%) 
Total 346 
189 
(54.6%) 
171 
(49.4%) 
160 
(46.2%) 
94 
(27.2%) 
88 
(25.4%) 
66 
(19.1%) 
50 
(14.5%) 
 
NB: This table does not include the figures for four other underlying motivations: day of 
judgement (38 articles); economics (33 articles); hatred towards other ethnicities (29 articles); 
and, hatred towards other terrorist groups (13 articles). It should also be pointed out that since 
many of the articles were assessed as having more than one underlying motivation the 
percentages in each row of the table add up to more 100%.  
 
Table 3 shows that the most common underlying motivation across the five magazines was 
hatred towards kuffar (54.6%), followed by religious obligation (49.4%) and hatred towards 
the West and its allies (46.2%). Differences between the magazines are also apparent 
(Macdonald 2016). Azan had the highest figure for both hatred towards kuffar and hatred 
towards other religions; Gaidi Mtaani had the highest figure for both hatred towards the West 
and its allies (in this case, Kenya) and revenge; and, Dabiq had the highest figure for 
religious obligation, geographical concerns (e.g., capturing territory) and unity. The findings 
in respect of Dabiq – which are consistent with the goal of the so-called Islamic State to 
establish a Caliphate – are particularly significant when viewed in the light of the 
justifications each magazine advanced. 
 
Table 4: The justifications employed in the articles. 
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Inspire 117 
98 
(83.8%) 
74 
(63.2%) 
31 
(26.5%) 
25 
(21.4%) 
32 
(27.4%) 
41 
(35.0%) 
22 
(18.8%) 
Dabiq 84 
55 
(65.5%) 
42 
(50%) 
35 
(41.7%) 
30 
(35.7%) 
36 
(42.9%) 
15 
(17.9%) 
10 
(11.9%) 
Azan 74 
66 
(89.2%) 
55 
(74.3%) 
32 
(43.2%) 
24 
(32.4%) 
13 
(17.6%) 
9 
(12.2%) 
15 
(20.3%) 
Jihad 
Recollections 
54 
31 
(57.4%) 
21 
(38.9%) 
21 
(38.9%) 
4 
(7.4%) 
0 
6 
(11.1%) 
12 
(22.2%) 
Gaidi 
Mtaani 
17 
8 
(47.1%) 
6 
(35.3%) 
4 
(23.5%) 
2 
(11.8%) 
0 
3 
(17.7%) 
4 
(23.5%) 
Total 346 
258 
(74.6%) 
198 
(57.2%) 
123 
(35.5%) 
85 
(24.6%) 
81 
(23.4%) 
74 
(21.4%) 
63 
(18.2%) 
 
NB: This table does not include the figures for two other justifications. The first is personal 
opinion. This was used as a justification in a total of 30 articles, 17 of which were published in 
Dabiq. The second is public opinion. This was used as a justification in a total of 18 articles, 
14 of which were published in Dabiq. Again, the figures on each row of the table do not add 
up to 100% because many articles were assessed as using more than one justification. 
 
For the purposes of the present discussion, three points emerge from these findings.iv First, 
whilst Allah, Quran and scholars were the three most commonly used justificatory grounds 
across the magazines, the highest proportion for all three of these was found in Azan (89.2%, 
74.3% and 43.2% respectively). This emphasis on words taken directly from the Quran and 
ones attributed to Allah is in keeping with Azan’s use of (implied) claims of divine authority 
to exercise power, as described above. 
Second, the figure for retaliation was far higher for Inspire than for the other four magazines. 
This finding is consistent with Hellmich’s (2014) study of statements of bin Laden across a 
variety of media, which concluded that the central theme of his reasoning was 
“… the suffering and humiliation of the umma, the global community of all Muslims, 
at the hands of the unbelievers, i.e., the US and its allies … The only way to defend the 
umma against this perceived aggression is through military (in effect, paramilitary) 
confrontation with America, which bin Ladin used to present in highly emotive terms 
as the rightful jihad of the present time against the principal enemy of God’s favoured 
community, and even of Islam itself … Yet, he was at pains to point out that his was a 
reactive kind of violence – an act of retaliation against what he perceived as the much 
greater form of aggression exercised by the West against the Muslim world over a far 
longer period of time” (243-244) 
Here again we see the coincidence of politics – using calls for retaliation to persuade readers 
and shape their conduct – and religion – framing the retaliatory acts as “rightful jihad” in 
response to the “suffering and humiliation of the umma”.  
The third point is that, whilst Dabiq had the highest proportion of articles that were motivated 
by religious obligation, the proportion of its articles that used either Allah or the Quran as a 
justificatory ground was below the average for the dataset as a whole. In fact, across all five 
magazines there were only 15 articles that were motivated by religious obligation but did not 
use either Allah or the Quran as a justification, and seven of these (46.7%) appeared in Dabiq 
(whereas only 24.3% of the articles in dataset as a whole appeared in Dabiq). By contrast, 
Dabiq had the highest figure for hadith/fatwa/religious text (35.7%) and by far the highest 
figure for leaders (42.9%). Also indicative of this emphasis on a wider range of sources of 
religious authority is Dabiq’s presentation of quotes from the Quran. Whilst it consistently cites 
the verse in the Quran from which quotes are taken, unlike the other four magazines Dabiq 
does not generally use a different colour for such quotes nor does it present them in bold or in 
italics, instead presenting them in the same way as quotes from other religious texts and the 
group’s leaders. Dabiq may thus be understood as part of the wider decentralisation and 
fragmentation of traditional structures of religious authority in Islam, in which “a broad 
spectrum of interpretations emerges, which provides alternative opinions to those of the 
traditional religious establishments” (Hellmich 2014, 247). This is possible, according to Aly 
(2016), because “epistemic authority in Islam in highly dependent on the perception and 
acceptance of authority by a social network as opposed to being embedded in an institutional 
order” (109). She argues that it is therefore important to “consider not only loci of religious 
authority but also the power of Muslim audiences to prefer one religious authority over 
another” (109). This observation not only helps explain the findings presented in table 4. It also 
points to the diversity of approaches and understandings that are possible within a single 
religion. Appealing to the sources of religious authority that are the most conducive to one’s 
message – and/or that are the most likely to be preferred by one’s audience – is an attempt to 
influence and persuade. It is therefore an exercise of power and another example of the overlap 
between politics and religion. 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst the four groups that produced the magazines examined in this study all claim to act in 
the name of the same religion, the findings presented in this article demonstrate that there are 
important differences in the messages that each group expounds in these publications. Azan 
prioritises traditional sources of religious authority and statements from named authority 
figures, manifesting hatred for kuffar and other religions. Inspire emphasises retaliation against 
the West, draws on both interviews with named authority figures and eulogies of rank-and-file 
individuals, and seeks to equip its readers with the skills needed to perpetrate acts of violence. 
Dabiq emphasises religious obligation but draws on a wider range of religious authorities 
including non-traditional sources (in particular, its own leaders), whilst also stressing territorial 
concerns. And Gaidi Mtaani is characterised by hatred towards the West and its allies – 
particularly Kenya – and a desire for revenge. The article thus provides empirical support for 
the criticisms set out earlier that question the analytical value of the term “religious terrorism”. 
First, the article has shown that important differences exist between the four groups examined 
in this study. Appreciating these nuances is essential in order to understand the groups’ 
objectives and individuals’ engagement with them, and to tailor appropriate responses. Yet 
these differences are obscured by clumping the groups together under the one homogeneous 
label. Second, the article has shown that differences between the magazines – in terms of their 
textual composition, self-portrayal, selection of religious authorities and underlying 
motivations – are the result of politics, understood as the exercise of power. Religion and 
politics are inextricably intertwined in the messages expounded in these magazines, and to 
attempt to erect a distinction between the two is impossible. 
Having shown that the term “religious terrorism” is analytically deficient, it is important to add 
by way of conclusion that the term also has political-normative consequences. Studies of the 
discourse of legislators and policy-makers have shown that the notion of religious terrorism 
has been used to “depoliticise and securitise in the political realm”, resulting in 
counterproductive counterterrorism laws and policies (Gunning and Jackson 2011, 382). 
Studies of the impact of these laws and policies on minority communities have shown that the 
notion of religious terrorism has contributed to a stigmatisation of the Muslim faith (Antúnez 
and Tellidis 2013; Hardy 2011). Breen-Smyth’s (2014) redefinition of the term “suspect 
community” explains how counterterrorism laws and policies that are focused on a particular 
sub-set of the population “[create] in the public mind a suspiciousness of people apparently in 
that category and renders them a ‘suspect community’” (232). Being “suspect” silences, 
marginalises and “also stimulates particular forms of self-censorship, especially in relation to 
political expression, with detrimental consequences for the possibility of participatory 
democracy” (223-224). The effect “has been to severely constrict the political space available 
to Muslims to engage critically with foreign policy” (237). This is particularly significant 
because, for many people across the religions, political participation is regarded as an essential 
outworking of their faith. Indeed, this is emphasised in the magazines examined in this study, 
as the following quote illustrates: 
“This separation of religion from life that democracy stands on is utter falsehood. The 
one who believes in it commits Kufr (disbelief). This principle is against all those clear 
verses and Ahadith which clearly state that Islam shall rule in government, politics, 
economics, societies, legislations and judiciaries. Islam is not limited to a few rituals of 
worship to be done inside some specific buildings. Hence, this false principle that 
separates Islam from human life is utter disbelief in the religion of Allah” (Azan, issue 
one, 64) 
Focusing on the voice of the violent actors themselves thus reveals a further damaging 
consequence of the term religious terrorism. Not only does it limit the perceived ability of 
members of the suspect community to engage in political expression; by separating the political 
from the religious it also reinforces the very Othering that characterises these groups’ 
dichotomous identity choice appeals (Ingram 2016; Lorenzo-Dus and Macdonald 2018). 
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i All four issues of Jihad Recollections were published in 2009 under the editorship of Samir Khan. Khan moved 
to Yemen and began work on Inspire in October 2009, publishing the first issue in 2010. This timeline – plus 
the fact that a biography of Khan published by al-Qaeda after Khan’s death that described Inspire as “an 
extension of Jihad Recollections, a magazine he described as ‘America’s Worst Nightmare’” – suggest that, at 
the very least, Jihad Recollections was endorsed by al-Qaeda even if it was not technically an al-Qaeda 
publication. 
ii Of the other seven statements, one was attributed to the Prophet Muhammed and the others were attributed to 
six different individuals (one of which was Anwar al-Awlaki). 
iii The editorials in three of the issues of Gaidi Mtaani (issues 1, 2 and 6) were not in the English language, and 
so could not be analysed. 
iv For further discussion see Macdonald (2016). 
                                                           
